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ABSTRACT
This article investigates an intertwined systematic and historical view on theories of
matter. It follows an approach brought forward by Hermann Weyl around 1925, applies
it to recent theories of matter in physics (including geometrodynamics and quantum
gravity), and embeds it into a more general philosophical framework. First, I shall discuss
the physical and philosophical problems of a unified field theory on the basis of Weyl’s
own abandonment of his 1918 ‘pure field theory’ in favour of an ‘agent theory’ of matter.
The difference between agent and field theories of matter is then used to establish a sort of
dialectic meta-view. With reference to Weyl this view can be understood as being a par-
ticular Fichtean transcendental idealist approach which attempts to combine the
strengths of the Husserlian phenomenology and Cassirer’s neo-Kantianism.
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1 Introduction
This article attempts to reconstruct Hermann Weyl’s change between different
ways of describing matter in physics and to investigate the philosophical sig-
nificance of Weyl’s systematic historiography of theories of matter which
partly resulted from this change and according to which the history of physics
exhibits—apart from early modern substantialist views on matter—a seesaw
between field and agent theories of matter. (To keep a clear systematic and
historical focus, my main sources for discussion will be Weyl’s 1924 paper on
‘Was ist Materie?’ and the 1926/27 original edition of his Philosophie der
Mathematik und Naturwissenschaft; i. e. not the revised English edition from
1949.1)
A possible ongoing significance of Weyl’s systematic historiography will
be examined by applying it to some more recent theoretical approaches to
matter in physics, namely to the Wheeler–Feynman action at a distance
theory, Wheeler’s geometrodynamics, the geometrodynamics of gauge fields,
and quantum gravity (quantum general relativity and string theory); see
Section 3. Finally, the wider philosophical significance of Weyl’s systematic
view on matter will be discussed in Section 4. Here, it will be shown to what
extent this view is only a part of Weyl’s general and rather particular transcen-
dental idealist framework which follows from a specific reading of Fichte and
which was brought forward by Weyl to strike a balance between the transcen-
dentalist frameworks of Husserlian phenomenology and Cassirer’s philosophy
of symbolic forms (cf. Friedman, [2005], p. 28).
To begin with, and to enable a better understanding of his philosophical
intentions around 1925, something must be said on Weyl’s abandonment of
his 1918 unified field theory. So Section 2 gives a brief discussion of both the
mathematical–physical as well as the philosophical reasons for Weyl’s turning
away from what he calls ‘pure field theory’ (reine Feldphysik) and towards an
‘agent theory’ (Agenstheorie) which takes matter to be transcendent; i.e., to be
beyond space and time. Whether also the stronger claim according to which
matter is a transcendental precondition for the constitution of spatio-temporal
events holds true for Weyl’s agent theory, is something to be discussed then as
well. Admittedly, this kind of philosophical move might appear rather alien to
an analytic audience which usually does not stand so much under the influence
of transcendental philosophy and post-Kantian Naturphilosophie as Weyl did.
However, given that several Husserlian and Fichtean inheritances in Weyl
1 Those texts are obviously Weyl’s most ambitious ones concerning a systematic approach
towards theories of matter; and they both fall within the same period of Weyl’s own physical
understanding of matter. For Weyl’s changing concept of matter between 1918 and 1930 see also
(Scholz [2007]).
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have been established over the last few years,2 the following investigation of
the relevance and pertinency of Weyl’s changing view on matter, in relation to
his peculiar philosophical and historical reflection on it, suggests itself.
2 Weyl on Pure Field Physics and Agent Theories of Matter
2.1 Weyl’s abandonment of pure field physics
According to Weyl’s section on matter in his 1926/27 Philosophy of
Mathematics and Natural Science, early modern times started with assuming
that matter is substance. Matter was assumed to be, one might say,
self-contained and self-sufficient and it was assumed to be the bearer of prop-
erties such as mass and extension. However, as Weyl shows, the development
of physics, in particular since the eighteenth century, made it plausible that
so-called substantial properties could be understood in terms of dynamics and
without assuming a separate bearer. In particular, this development was fos-
tered by the growth and consolidation of electromagnetism; and with this field
theoretic views of matter more or less replaced substantialist views. Indeed, it
even became tempting to reduce matter completely to (classical) fields. A very
influential example of such a ‘pure field theory’, as Weyl calls it, is the elec-
tromagnetic programme by the German physicist Gustav Mie. Roughly
speaking, Mie wanted to reduce all forces to electromagnetic fields and
claimed that matter was nothing but knots in the all-embracing electromag-
netic field as being the ‘world substance’ or ‘world ether’ (Mie [1912a], [1912b],
[1925]; cf. also Vizgin [1994], pp. 26–38; and Weyl’s statements about Mie in
Weyl [1921]).
This was in 1912 and three years later the next important pure field theory
was suggested by Hilbert (Hilbert [1915]); and another three years later it was
Weyl himself who brought forward such a theory (Weyl [1918], [1919]). Since
it was now 1918, Weyl could start from a different classical field theory,
namely, general relativity. Also, intuitively this might be a more promising
approach as compared with Mie, since one now tries to dissolve matter into
time and space instead of into electromagnetism.3 Arguably, and as Weyl
himself acknowledges, the programmatic idea of his unified field theory is
similar to Mie’s. In both cases the philosophical background assumption is
that of matter being reducible to fields and—since Weyl understood pure field
2 As for the influence of Husserl on Weyl’s 1918 unified field theory and that of Fichte on Weyl’s
later agent theory see (Ryckman [2005]; Sieroka [2007]), respectively. Cf. also (Sigurdsson
[1991]).
3 For more on this approach see, for instance (Sigurdsson [1991]; Scholz [1995]; Ryckman [2005]).
Let me also add that one of the main problems of Mie’s approach was the fact that it had to
attribute physical relevance to the absolute value of the electromagnetic potential; cf. (Pauli
[1920]).
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physics as an attempt towards a ‘world geometry’ (cf. Ryckman [2005])—as
being reducible to geometry. Accordingly, in his philosophical reflection of
1926/27, Weyl showed a direct historical line from the old Cartesian assump-
tion of matter being pure extension (res extensa) to modern pure field theoretic
approaches. For Descartes had already claimed that ‘all natural phenomena
can be explained [by using the principles of geometry] and any other principles
in science are neither allowed nor desirable’ (Descartes [1992], p. 63, Part 2,
para. 64).
Independently of his own historical reconstruction of such a tempting re-
duction of matter, Weyl himself became sceptical about his own 1918 unified
field theory and indeed about all attempts in pure field physics by about 1920.
The major physical reason for this was the problem of discreteness or, as Weyl
puts it, of the ‘grainy’ (ko¨rnig) structure of reality. All field theories are fun-
damentally continuous and all approaches towards a unified field theory (be it
Mie’s, Hilbert’s, Einstein’s or Weyl’s) suffered from the fact that they could
not deduce things like the existence of an elementary charge. And that it was
indeed this general worry that convinced Weyl to abandon pure field physics
(and not so much the detailed criticisms against certain aspects of his particu-
lar 1918 approach), this can be seen from several sources: obviously Weyl was
not much impressed by Einstein’s famous criticism and replied by distinguish-
ing between what he called ‘adjustment’ (Einstellung) und ‘persistence’
(Beharrung).4 And also the several detailed criticisms in Pauli’s famous en-
cyclopedia entry on relativity are not particularly discussed or acknowledged
by Weyl as being fatal for his theory.5 However, what stuck was the following
very general criticism by Pauli:
Whatever one thinks about these arguments in detail, one thing is for
sure, namely that new elements which are alien to the continuity concept
of fields must be added to the basis of these theories [the unified field
4 The question whether this is a physically satisfying response or whether it detaches his theory
from experience is not something I will discuss here as this has been dealt with in detail else-
where; see (Fogel [2008]). The only philosophically relevant point to mention here is that Weyl
called the process of adjustment of, e.g., the charge of an electron one of ‘ideal positing’ (ideale
Setzung); cf. (Weyl [1928], p. 149). Given Weyl’s close acquaintance with Fichtean philosophy
the term ‘positing’ seems to be no coincidence but rather hints at his assumption of some
transcendental constituting processes (see below; the term ‘ideal’ seems to point to Hilbert’s
method of ideal elements, which arguably must be posited as well).
5 These criticisms mainly are: the fourth-order nonlinear differential equations of Weyl’s ap-
proach are much too complicated for a theory which should be physically motivated; within
Weyl’s approach gravitational attraction and electric repulsion should balance one another, but
because of e=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Gm
p  1020 this seems hopeless; the differential equations for positive and nega-
tive electric charges are the same (this was considered a problem around 1920 since in those days
the hydrogen nucleon—with a mass of around eighteen hundred times of that of an elec-
tron!—was considered to be the positive ‘counter-particle’ of the electron); cf. (Pauli [1920],
pp. 759–75).
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theories of Mie, Einstein and Weyl] to arrive at a satisfactory solution to
the problem of matter.6
Also for Weyl it had not been some inner-theoretic details that made him
abandon his unified field theory, but rather this general concern about the
relation between continuous fields and discrete matter; and indeed in Weyl’s
case this concern was intimately connected to his views on the mathematical
continuum and on some of his philosophical convictions. (More recently,
there has also been the assumption that Weyl abandoned his 1918 approach
mainly or only because quantum mechanics provides an absolute unit of
length which his field theory lacked. But this is not even physically convincing,
since Weyl could also admit such an absolute standard of length within his
approach by means of ‘adjustment’ (Fogel [2008], pp. 47–51). Moreover, the
strongest evidence one finds in favour of this view dates from around 1930
when the new gauge principle was also already in place (Weyl [1929], [1931b]).
So arguably these are historically delicate sources for understanding Weyl’s
abandonment of pure field theory in the first place, i.e. around 1920.)
Weyl explicitly criticized field theories because of their conceptual oppos-
ition to findings about the atomic realm. The latter, according to Weyl, ‘is
widely dominated by integral numbers’ whereas field physics can only describe
a ‘silent continuous flow’ and ‘completely rests in continuity’ (Weyl [1927],
pp. 130 and 133). But how does this lead to an agent theory with its peculiar
explanation of the ongoings in the atomic realm? To understand this, the
scope in which Weyl’s considerations took place must be widened towards
Weyl’s mathematical attempts to tame the tension between continuity and
discreteness (which was already a major topic in his 1918 Das Kontinuum),
and towards his philosophical approach on causation and time (which was
indicated in the last quote by Weyl’s usage of the terms ‘silent’ and ‘rests’).
That indeed Weyl’s move towards an agent theory has something to do with
inner-mathematical considerations is already evident from the first source for
his abandonment of pure field physics. In a letter to Pauli in December 1919,
when Weyl already knew the aforementioned criticisms, he wrote that he is
‘deeply convinced that statistics is something which is independent in principle
from “law’’; for it is altogether self-contradictory, to imagine a continuum as
being something finished’.7 By ‘law’ Weyl here means the functional relations
within field physics as opposed to the relations describing the atomic realm
which he assumes to be fundamentally probabilistic (cf. Weyl [1920]).
6 ‘Wie immer man sich im Einzelnen zu diesen Argumenten stellen mag, so viel scheint sicher
zu sein, daß zu den Grundlagen der bisher aufgestellten Theorien erst neue, der
Kontinuumsauffassung des Feldes fremde Elemente hinzukommen mu¨ssen, damit man zu
einer befriedigenden Lo¨sung des Problems der Materie gelangt’ (Pauli [1920], p. 775).
7 ETH-Bibliothek, Archive, Hs 176: 1 (‘Denn ich bin fest u¨berzeugt davon, daß die Statistik etwas
prinzipiell Selbsta¨ndiges gegenu¨ber [. . .] dem “Gesetz” ist; weil es u¨berhaupt widersinnig ist, sich
ein Kontinuum als etwas fertig-Seiendes vorzustellen.’)
Geometrization Versus Transcendent Matter 773
(Sometimes Weyl even speaks of field physics as being ‘pure law physics’; reine
Gesetzesphysik.) So Weyl thinks that in the case of the latter, statistics plays
a genuine role; and so this case is unlike those where one uses statistics just
as an abbreviating tool in order to enable a description of systems which
would otherwise be too complex to handle.
Taking those points together, what Weyl is seeking is a kind of ‘process
account’ of a continuum which is not governed by some law or algorithm
but which could only be described by means of statistics; and one obvious
candidate for him around 1920 would be L. E. J. Brouwer’s free choice
sequences. (Since so much has been written on Weyl’s short-term alliance
with intuitionism, it might be enough for present purposes to remind the
reader that according to Brouwer’s approach a continuum is understood to
be a ‘medium of free becoming’ because it is generated by a process of ongoing
free decision making. The mathematician has to come up again and again with
natural numbers to construct a continuum; and so a mathematical description
of this spontaneous process itself could only be given by means of statistics.8)
A different, and perhaps less well-known candidate, would be the collectives
(Kollektivs) of Richard von Mises. von Mises’s 1919 Grundlagen der
Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung was (until the work by Kolmogoroff in 1933)
the standard work in the foundation of statistics. It gives an account of prob-
ability in frequentist terms and starts from a notion of collectives as stable and
lawless sequences of observations (von Mises [1919], pp. 55–8). Indeed just like
in Weyl’s case, von Mises’s motivation here was the conviction that statistics
(as opposed to pure law) plays a genuine role in descriptions of physical reality
(See Ibid., and more explicitly von Mises [1928], p. 178). Though admittedly
von Mises’s conviction originated from his understanding of Brownian
motion and thermodynamics rather than from quantum mechanics, the par-
allels to Weyl in seeing this close connection between the foundation of physics
and statistics (and indeed also geometry) are striking; and in a way they hint
at a possibility of naturalizing Brouwer’s choice sequences.9
With this (indeed rather vague) idea of a naturalized process of decision
making, Weyl could now interpret the ongoings in the atomic realm as
being similar to what the spontaneous mathematician is doing with his
8 To avoid rather subtle discussions which would blur the focus of this article, I will use the terms
‘spontaneous’ and ‘free’ synonymously here and leave a more detailed discussion of what might
be a relevant natural philosophical difference between them for another occasion.
9 The reason for Weyl’s and von Mises’s assumption of this close connection might have very well
been the formulation of the sixth problem in Hilbert’s famous list of mathematical problems
from 1900 which also combined geometry, statistics, and the foundation of physics; see (Hilbert
[1900]) and recently (Hochkirchen [1999]). Since it is fairly certain that Weyl knew von Mises’s
work, one might speculate why Weyl does not refer to it directly. Perhaps this was due to von
Mises’s pure frequentism (as opposed to a chance or propensity interpretation of probability)
and his complete denial of causality; cf. (von Mises [1928], pp. 170–9). For arguably both
assumptions fit into field rather than into agent theories of matter.
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choice sequences. Like the mathematician who is generating or constituting
a continuum, atomic events spontaneously generate the space–time con-
tinuum. Weyl hence also speaks of the ‘realm of quantum decisions’ (cf.
Weyl [1920], p. 122). So space–time itself is thought to be evolving in an
infinite process both inwards and outwards. As time proceeds, Weyl argues,
there is not only an ‘outward development’ (i.e. time does not only ‘go on’)
but it also becomes ‘more fine-grained’.10 Since the details of this process
have already been elaborated on elsewhere (Sieroka [2007]), and since the
details of Weyl’s account also slightly changed over time, it seems sufficient
here to emphasize that Weyl (at least up to mid-1920s) generally adhered to
the view that there must be an intimate connection between statistics and
the construction or description of a continuum.11
2.2 The philosophical tradition of agent theories
So in a sense matter and man draw near in Weyl’s agent theory. Both are
viewed as somehow being capable of decision making, as being active and
spontaneous. Indeed, this rapprochement of matter and man is in line with
what throughout his 1926/27 book Weyl says about man as being both a
natural and a conscious being and about the mind–body relation. Here,
Weyl’s argumentation is within a typical ‘continental’ tradition and starts
from a concept of the ego as being fundamentally active; a concept one
most prominently finds in Fichte. Together with this, Weyl claims that it is
only because human beings experience themselves as ‘I am doing something’,
as being causes in the world and also as feeling resistance from outside bodies,
that the notion of cause and effect arises (Weyl [1927], pp. 147–9).12 (This view
is, of course, strikingly different from Hume’s account of causation as a con-
stant conjunction. Consequently, Weyl describes the Humean account as the
ancestral view for what is left of causation in field physics, namely functional
relations (Weyl [1927], pp. 144–5).13) For Weyl causation in the philosophical
(not the modern physical) sense has something to do with agency and so pure
10 As Weyl makes explicit (ibid., pp. 121–2) this inward becoming is indeed more than the relativ-
istic effect that with the temporal proceeding of the light cone more and more past events come
into view.
11 See in particular (Weyl [1988], p. 12), where he speaks no longer of Brouwer’s free choice
sequences, but still in the context of discussing continuous manifolds claims that ‘the contem-
porary state of physics indicates [. . .] a probabilistic approach’.
12 See also (Weyl [1932], p. 31), where ‘acting upon from beyond’ (Hineinwirken) is described as the
primal experience of causation.
13 See also (Hume [1975], p. 67, footnote), for a rather weak reply against an experiential (‘I am
doing this’) view of causation. Notably, however, Weyl’s experiential view of causation of
around 1925 also deviates considerably from his own phenomenological framework of 1918;
cf. (Tietjen [1980]; Sieroka [2007]) for some general differences in a Husserlian as compared with
a Fichtean view on subjectivity, space–time, and causation.)
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field physics in which one aims at reducing matter to fields is in this philo-
sophical sense not a causal theory. There are no agents, hence no causes and
effects, and hence field physics is ‘silent’, as he put it above.
In contrast, the agent theory is meant to put matter back into its ‘right of
causal efficacy’ (Wirklichkeitsrecht). Weyl here refers to Leibniz as the ‘ances-
tor of all modern dynamical views of matter’; i.e., of all agent theories (indeed
Weyl’s usage of the Latin term ‘agens’ is borrowed from Leibniz). In sharp
contrast to Descartes as being the founding father of pure field theory, for
Leibniz ‘there is something to material objects apart from extension, even
prior to extension’ that ‘constitutes the innermost nature of matter’ (Leibniz
[1982b], p. 3). For Leibniz matter is not the object of pure geometrical treat-
ment but is foremost acting and hence is a metaphysical substance like a ‘soul’
(Ibid.). Similarly, also in Weyl’s agent theory the concepts of matter and con-
sciousness (or soul, or ego) are tied together by emphasizing their spontaneous
activity (Weyl [1924], pp. 493 and 510, [1923], pp. 5–6).
What is more, and here again Weyl follows a whole tradition from Leibniz
to Fichte, Schelling and others, it is causation that gives the directedness of
time. According to this view, the earlier–later relation is a consequence of the
relation between causes and effects. Correspondingly, pure field physics inso-
far as it fails to incorporate matter as a causal agent also fails to account for
the experienced directedness of time. For Weyl, this is also plausible given the
physical formalism of field physics which is invariant under time reversal. In
contrast to this, statistics (being the key concept in quantum mechanics) brings
temporal directedness into physics because in statistics we always ‘deduce the
probable state at a subsequent moment [. . .], and not the state at a previous
one’ (Weyl [1932], p. 49; cf. also Weyl [1921], pp. 240–2 and 255–6).
(Admittedly, this is a rather weak argument. But instead of criticizing it in
detail, let me say a little more on the relation between matter as an agent and
the constitution of space now. For together with what has been said about
agency, causality and time this will top off the discussion of Weyl’s agent
theory and will enable me to show its origin in the aforementioned philosoph-
ical tradition.)
In his 1921 paper on field and matter, Weyl showed that it is a consequence
of general relativity and electrodynamics that it makes no sense to describe the
inside of a particle, for within it—like within a black hole—classical field
physics breaks down.14 Further, by using Gauss’s theorem (i.e., by turning
all relevant volume integrals into surface integrals) Weyl shows that every-
thing which was so far described as being a property of a particle can equally
well be described by looking exclusively at some spatio-temporal
14 Ibid. It is also in this paper (p. 242) that Weyl claims that ‘for cogent reasons field theories of
matter made me mad’ (‘bin ich jedoch, aus triftigen Gru¨nden an der Feldtheorie der Materie irre
geworden’).
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neighbourhood (Umgebung) where fields can be measured. This result is rele-
vant for physics because the description of extended bodies was known to be
a serious problem for field theories for quite some time.15
These considerations originated in the context of a classical–relativist ap-
proach to matter in terms of singularities, which was defended by Weyl only
for a very brief period and according to which space–time is no longer a simply
connected manifold, but rather like a Swiss cheese.16 However, in a sense these
considerations retained their philosophical importance for Weyl also after the
dawn of quantum physics. Weyl still emphasized the notion of a spatio-tem-
poral neighbourhood around the middle of the 1920s. He then said that one
should not dispense with matter altogether, but one should dispense with the
assumption that it is spatially extended (Weyl [1923], p. 288, [1924], p. 510).17
All space consists of, according to Weyl, are neighbourhoods in which one
might measure field effects. But there is no spatio-temporal inside or boundary
of particles. To put it bluntly: matter gets ‘thrown out of space–time’. It is
assumed by Weyl to be non-extensive or ‘extramundane’. Matter is an agent in
the sense that it stands ‘behind’ the fields, that it excites and determines them
‘from beyond’ (Ibid.). The four-dimensional fields themselves then are only the
‘forceless transmitters’ of an extramundane activity.18
Around 1926, Weyl speculates further about how this extramundane realm
from which matter constitutes spatio-temporal events could be described.
He suggests that the infinite-dimensional Hilbert space of quantum mechanics
might be the ‘extramundane location’ of matter and that the quantum mech-
anical projection operators might account for the causal efficacy that matter
has in spatio-temporal reality (Weyl [1927], pp. 142–3). Here, Weyl’s argu-
mentation also coincides with what has already been said about statistics and
about decision making; namely that four-dimensional space–time can be
described by the non-causal (meant in Weyl’s philosophical sense) functional
relations of field physics, whereas the extramundane realm of matter can only
15 It was proved by Poincare´ ([1906]) that if one assumes an electron to be a pointlike particle, then
its static energy turns out to be infinite; and that if on the other hand one assumes an electron to
be an extended object, then an additional interaction would be needed to prevent the electron
from bursting due to its inner electrostatic repulsion.
16 See (Scholz [2007]) for details. Weyl states that from a mathematical point of view there is no
problem with such a rather complex topological structure of space–time; see (Weyl [1921],
p. 253). For a more recent discussion of what general relativity would look like in multi-
connected spaces, cf. (Lachieze-Rey and Luminet [1995]).
17 (‘Danach ist das Materieteilchen selber nicht einmal ein Punkt im Feldraume, sondern u¨berhaupt
nichts Ra¨umliches (Extensives), aber es steckt in einer ra¨umlichen Umgebung drin, von welcher
seine Feldwirkungen ihren Ausgang nehmen.’)
18 See also Weyl’s letter to Felix Klein from 1920, quoted in (Sigurdsson [1991], p. 204) (though my
translation slightly differs): ‘Finally I liberated myself from Mie’s theory of matter thoroughly
and I have achieved a new position with respect to the problem of matter. Field physics no
longer appears to me as the key to reality. Just the opposite: the field, the ether, now appears to
me only as a transfer medium of effects, which in itself is only a completely forceless transmitter.
Matter, however, is the reality beyond the field and determines its states.’
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be described by means of a probabilistic theory. For, it is the realm of causal
agents and decision making.
Whereas it should be undisputed that according to Weyl’s agent theory
matter (together with the ego) exists beyond space and time, it might be ques-
tionable how seriously one should take the idea that time only follows from
causes and effects originating from the spontaneous activity of this agent, and
that the spatial appearances one can measure in terms of fields are always
(and only) the effects of extramundane matter. So the question which arises
is whether matter as an agent is not only transcendent but also transcendental;
i.e., whether it is not only ‘extramundane’ but also the precondition for the
possibility of space and time. For without the spontaneous activity of matter
(and ego) there would be no directed time and there would be no fields.
Within so-called ‘continental philosophy’, there is a rather strong tradition
of viewing matter as being the transcendental precondition for space and time.
And, as Weyl acknowledges in the preface of the revised English edition of
Philosophie der Mathematik und Naturwissenschaft, the original edition was
strongly influenced by this transcendental idealist tradition in philosophy
(Weyl [2000], p. 5). Indeed, it is only the original version in which Weyl de-
votes a separate section to agent theories of matter. In this section, Weyl
explicitly refers to Schelling as the one who had ‘an idea which anticipated
the modern development’ of the agent concept of matter (Weyl [1927], p. 134).
According to Schelling’s ‘natural philosophy’ (Naturphilosophie) ‘what
fills space cannot be matter’ (Schelling [1985], p. 360).19 For him matter is
‘pure intensity’ and is located beyond space and time (Ibid., pp. 360–1).
Furthermore, the three-dimensionality of space is, according to Schelling, a
direct consequence of the three physical forces inherent to this extramundane
matter.20 Surely the details of Schelling’s approach seem rather absurd from a
contemporary perspective. Also Weyl does not adopt those details. His inter-
est lies only in the general idea of matter being a transcendental precondition
for spatio-temporal events, and he plays around with this idea.
Already a few years earlier when claiming that fields are only forceless
transmitters of extramundane activity, Weyl wrote that the ‘cause’ or ‘foun-
dation’ of physical reality ‘is not grasped’ by field physics; for him field physics
‘does not say anything about the core-content of reality’, but rather covers
only the ‘surface aspects of a necessity that is “not of this world’’’.21
19 ‘Was also den Raum erfu¨llt, kann nicht Materie sein’.
20 Cf., e.g., (ibid., p. 389), where he speaks of magnetism, electricity, and chemical processes as
being the ‘general schemes of the construction of nature’, each being responsible for the con-
struction of one spatial dimension. See also (Schelling [2000], pp. 37 and 108–19).
21 Quoted from an open letter of Weyl, published in (Bovet [1922], p. 903) (‘[. . .] aber u¨ber das
inhaltlich-Wesenhafte der Wirklichkeit machen sie [die physikalischen Gesetze der Feldtheorie]
nichts aus, der Grund der Wirklichkeit wird in ihnen nicht erfasst. Zwar lassen sie nicht jeder
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Subsequently, Weyl also offers a philosophical speculation about what the
essence or ‘inner constitution’ of matter as an agent might be; namely ‘life and
will’ (Weyl [1924], p. 510).22 Indeed, Fichte used the terms ‘life’ and ‘will’
synonymously in two versions of his Wissenschaftslehre and they exactly
refer to the workings of the productive imagination in constituting the exter-
nal world (cf. Scha¨fer [1967], pp. 174 and 195–222). Also what Weyl said
above about the role of quantum decisions is nearly what both Fichte and
Schelling say about the ‘real’ and the ‘ideal activity’ of the productive imagin-
ation.23 Given Weyl’s expertise, especially on Fichte, it is unlikely that this is
just a coincidence. Again, this is not meant to say that Weyl followed Fichte or
Schelling in detail. Weyl even makes it explicit that what he says about pre-
conditions or the inner development of space–time is more like some sort of
guess work (Weyl [1920], p. 122). However, the fact that he does this guess
work shows that he is acquainted with this particular philosophical tradition
and that indeed he has at least some general sympathy towards it.
Also the way in which Weyl brings together matter and consciousness (with-
out equating them) is similar to what Fichte says. Like Fichte, Weyl argues
that there is a necessary connection between an ego and its body. The body is
assumed to be the sphere of the ego’s free actions; indeed, the body is thereby
constituted by transcendental spontaneity and appears as a spatio-temporal
neighbourhood (Fichte [1979], pp. 56–61; cf. Weyl [1924], p. 510, [1927],
p. 133). (One could carry on this discussion and complement it with what
Fritz Medicus—whom I will come back to later—said about Weyl’s agent
theory.24 However, for present purposes the hints at Weyl’s specific transcen-
dental idealist background might be sufficient and so I would rather briefly
sum up the conclusions of this section.)
If one takes together both Weyl’s scientific and his philosophical consider-
ations and convictions, one might summarize the respective costs and benefits
of a pure field theory and an agent theory as follows: all one could ideally get
from a pure field theory would be a unification of electromagnetic and gravi-
tational phenomena in physics; the chances of getting quantum mechanics
into the picture (let alone the mathematical analysis of the continuum or
Laune und Willku¨r freie Bahn, aber nichts hindert uns, sie als einen Oberfla¨chen-Aspekt einer
Notwendigkeit aufzufassen, die “nicht von dieser Welt” ist.’).
22 ‘Was dieses felderregende Agens aber seinem inneren Wesen nach auch sein mag – vielleicht
Leben und Wille – [. . .]’. He uses the same terms (Leben und Wille) also in (Bovet [1922], p. 904).
23 See, for instance, (Fichte [1997], pp. 211–29), and (Schelling [1985], pp. 355–7), though obvi-
ously there is a difference between the two as to whether the productive imagination might be
something in nature (so to speak ‘de-personalized’) or not.
24 See (Medicus [1926]), on the notions of blind necessity and productivity in nature, or on how the
agent theory turns matter from an ‘it’ (Es) into a ‘you’ (Du) and thereby kind of naturalizes
Fichte’s transcendental argument from the Naturrecht about intersubjectivity being a precon-
dition for subjective freedom.
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the philosophical concern about human beings as part of nature) would be
very limited. In contrast, if the agent theory could be worked out further, it
would not only be able to describe electromagnetic and gravitational phe-
nomena, but would also include quantum mechanics, and together with it
a satisfying understanding of space–time (as being an inward and outward
developing entity), and also understanding of human beings as part of nature
(having physical bodies, making decisions, experiencing their causal efficacy
and a flow of time). Although this is not meant as an a priori argument against
the programme of ‘pure field physics’, Weyl’s project of an agent theory fol-
lows to a large extent the tradition of a Schellingian Naturphilosophie and a
Fichtean transcendental philosophy of nature. One might also view it as an
accomplishment of a Leibnizian agent theory with ‘quantum monads’ being
the basic constituents of (transcendent) matter. Within such an interpretation,
field physics—which describes only the transmission of forces through space
and time—accounts for what according to Weyl was still missing in Leibniz,
namely ‘the communication of the monads’ (Weyl [1924], p. 510).25
3 A Weylian Classification of Recent Theories of Matter
Having discussed the different mathematical, physical, and philosophical con-
cepts and concerns involved in Weyl’s distinction between field and agent
theories of matter, and given that Weyl claims that this distinction has been
in place since the early modern period, the obvious question to ask now is
whether this distinction is applicable to theories of matter dating from after
1926. Admittedly, the physical approaches, or theories, to discuss now are
philosophically much less ambitious than especially Weyl’s agent theory was.
However, as will be shown, the concerns about whether matter can be reduced
to geometry, or about how the directedness of time is related to causation,
have been pretty much in place in physics as well during the second half of the
twentieth century.
I shall start my Weylian classification of some recent theories of matter with
the direct interparticle action view of Wheeler–Feynman and Wheeler’s geo-
metrodynamics. Admittedly, these approaches are of no particular relevance
for contemporary physics, but they will allow a few more words about what
Weyl called substance theories of matter and which I have only mentioned in
passing above. Further, they nicely illustrate how Weyl’s philosophical con-
siderations about a dualism of matter and field—and whether it should be
overcome or not—showed up from time to time also in the second half of the
twentieth century. Moreover, Wheeler explicitly claims that with his (classical)
25 Remember that according to Leibniz each lump of matter is a metaphysical substance; i.e., has a
monadic structure and does not interact with other substances; famously, ‘monads do not have
windows’ (Leibniz [1982a], p. 29, para. 7).
Norman Sieroka780
geometrodynamics he stands in the tradition of Weyl, as do contemporary
self-proclaimed successors of Wheeler who argue for some geometrodynamics
of gauge fields which I shall also discuss below. Finally, the two currently
prominent attempts to quantize gravitation, namely the direct quantization
of general relativity (in its different facets) and string theory, will be evaluated
against Weyl’s distinction between field and agent theories of matter.
3.1 Direct interparticle action
In 1949, John Wheeler and Richard Feynman developed a theory of matter
that aimed at a classical mechanical description of a system of interacting
point-like particles without having to assume self-interaction (Wheeler and
Feynman [1949]). Since the problem of self-interaction only occured in the
post-Newtonian age of field physics, Wheeler and Feynman claimed their
theory to be the ‘natural and self-consistent generalization of Newtonian
mechanics to the four-dimensional space of Lorentz and Einstein’ (Ibid.,
p. 426). And, as in Newtonian mechanics, they assume that particles do inter-
act directly over distance and so name their approach ‘direct interparticle
action’.
Although this theory does not involve ‘fields’ as being independent degrees
of freedom, it still turns out to be mathematically equivalent to what Wheeler
and Feynman call an ‘adjunctive field theory’. Within the adjunctive field
theory, the motion of a particle a is given by the sum of the ‘fields’ (forces)
of all particles acting on a but without any contribution by a itself. More
relevant for the following philosophical discussion, however, is the fact that
the adjunctive fields are given (one half each) by the retarded and the advanced
solutions of the Maxwell equations.
This approach is exactly what Weyl dubbed a substance theory of matter.
With its assumption of direct particle interaction and also its explicit reference
to Newton, it shows itself as being within a tradition where there are no
(genuine) fields but where matter is the only inhabitant of space and is
self-contained. Besides which, given that classical mechanics like electromag-
netism is invariant under time reversal, the Wheeler–Feynman approach can
account neither for Weyl’s strong concepts of cause and effect, nor, as a con-
sequence, for the directedness of time. But here it is striking to see how
Wheeler and Feynman are trying to turn this into an advantage of their
theory. For they claim that with the equal contribution of the retarded and
the advanced solutions of the Maxwell equations, ‘the symmetry between past
and future in the prescription for the fields is not a mere logical possibility, as
in the usual theory, but a postulational requirement’ (Ibid., p. 426). They even
see a direct link between the directedness of time and causation and indeed bite
the bullet by claiming that ‘the distinction between cause and effect is
Geometrization Versus Transcendent Matter 781
pointless’ (Ibid., p. 428). These claims must, of course, be read in opposition to
field physics where by an ad hoc stipulation only the retarded solutions are
considered. Therefore, Wheeler and Feynman think that they have accom-
plished what so far was only aimed at in physics. Weyl, however, would pre-
sumably rather view this denial of causation as a consequence (or even as
the completion) of a Humean tradition and as a great step backwards in
approaching matter. Not only is a miraculous action at a distance, which
was overcome in field theory, reintroduced but also the major drawbacks of
field theory (no genuine causation, no directedness of time) are still in place
in the Wheeler–Feynman approach.
3.2 Wheeler’s geometrodynamics
A prominent attempt to develop pure field physics within the second half of
the twentieth century was John Wheeler’s geometrodynamics. Like Weyl’s
unified field theory of 1918, Wheeler’s project was particularly motivated by
general relativity and also aimed at reducing matter to the geometrical features
of space–time.26 However, it also shares a feature with Weyl’s agent theory
because it assumes that space–time is not a simply connected manifold.27
Let me explain all this in some more detail.
Wheeler claims that ‘in geometrodynamics, mass and charge are not
idealized as properties of point particles, they are, instead, aspects of the geo-
metrical structure of space’ (Misner and Wheeler [1957], p. 595–6). According
to this view something that appears to us as being matter is just a circulating
lump of electromagnetic and/or gravitational radiation that is kept together
by its own gravitational force. Wheeler calls such lumps ‘gravitational-
electromagnetic entities’, or ‘geons’ for short. He says: ‘To the outside the
geon manifests mass, but inside there is nowhere that one can put his finger
and say “Here is ‘real’ mass!’’ ’ (Wheeler [1961], p. 65). And what appears to
be a positive and a negative charge are nothing but a bunch of electric field
lines which are so to speak ‘added to the normal space–time container’ like
a handle on a mug; and it is because of the normally poor resolving power of
the observer that the two ends of such a handle behave or ‘look’ like a positive
and a negative elementary electric charge (Ibid., p. 78).28 However, strictly
speaking there is again, as Wheeler emphasizes, ‘nowhere that one can put his
26 Wheeler ([1961], p. 78) defines his project as being ‘that formulation of standard general rela-
tivity in which attention is restricted to curved empty space, free of all singularities and of all
“real masses’’, which lie outside the framework of classical physics’.
27 Indeed Misner and Wheeler ([1957], p. 532), explicitly claim to stand in the tradition of Weyl
here. They refer to (Weyl [1927], p. 64), which might indeed be inappropriate given the coun-
terfactual inflection of this passage; see also (Mancosu and Ryckman [2005]). For the general
influence of Weyl’s thinking on Wheeler cf. (Wheeler [1986]).
28 Wheeler famously called these handles ‘wormholes’.
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finger and say, “This is where some charge is located.” ’ (Misner and Wheeler
[1957], p. 532).
These handles then turn space–time into something topologically complex.
But although such a complex topology also followed from Weyl’s agent
theory, the view here is strikingly different. In Weyl’s case, the complex top-
ology followed from the fact that matter is beyond space and time (‘extra-
mundane’); in Wheeler’s case it follows from the fact that matter is to be
dissolved ‘innermundanely’ in space–time. From a Weylian perspective,
then, geometrodynamics is an example of a purely field theoretic approach
that ‘completely rests in continuity’; and so it does not come as much of a
surprise that this approach, as I will explain now, has serious problems
accounting for quantum phenomena.
The aforementioned concepts of mass and charge within geometrodynamics
are those of general relativity and classical electrodynamics; i.e., up to now
nothing has been said about quantum physical concepts. But Wheeler
announced his programme around 1960, and his claim was that quantum
physics should be incorporated in his approach. He writes that ‘we would
hardly have taken up the analysis of classical geometrodynamics if we did
not hope to find out what, if anything, quantum geometrodynamics has to
do with elementary particle physics’ (Ibid., p. 534; see also Wheeler [1968]).
However, the obvious difficulty is to account for all the quantum phenomena
we know of today—including strong and weak processes as completely new
types of interactions—exclusively in terms of properties of four-dimensional
space–time.29 (At least one further property that might come to mind here
would be torsion. If space–time can have holes and handles, why after all
should it not be twisted as well? Indeed, the basic mathematical idea here
goes already back to E´lie Cartan; and within geometrodynamics the concept
of torsion amounts to an introduction of spin (cf. e.g. Hehl [1973]). However,
this is hardly enough for the full-blown ‘quantum geometrodynamics’
Wheeler demands.)
So at least as far as quantum physics is concerned Wheeler’s original geo-
metrodynamics, with its attention being restricted to curved empty space,
pretty much got stuck on the level of being a programmatic proclamation;
and it seems that only a considerable widening of the notion of geometry could
get it under way again.
29 Other problems of Wheeler’s approach include the huge mass, which indeed is not even con-
stant, and diameter of a geon which would be >1039 g and >1011 cm, respectively. So it is very
difficult to relate geons to what we usually think of as being fundamental physical entities; as
(Wheeler [1961], p. 66), acknowledges, geons ‘have not the slightest direct connection with the
world of elementary particle physics’.
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3.3 Geometrodynamics of gauge fields
Someone who claims to stand in the tradition of Wheeler and to be able to
work out a geometrization of all known interactions is Eckehard Mielke with
his Geometrodynamics of Gauge Fields (Mielke [1987]).30 Pretty much like
Wheeler, Mielke is ‘striving for a unified geometrical description of funda-
mental physical interactions’ starting from general relativity which he thinks
to be the ‘prototype of a physical theory’ (Mielke [1987], pp. 5 and 11).
Moreover, Mielke shows a considerable historical and epistemological aware-
ness of Weyl’s theories of matter and explicitly claims to follow the tradition
not only of Wheeler but also of Weyl’s 1918 unified field theory (cf. Ibid.,
pp. 131–2; Mielke and Hehl [1988]). According to Mielke the problem with the
latter two (though they were ‘pursuing the right track’) was that the geome-
trization programme was seen ‘in a possibly too narrow frame’ (Mielke [1987],
p. 131).
According to Mielke, the appropriate mathematical tools for such a geo-
metrization programme are the concepts of fibre bundles and differential
forms. The appropriate structures to investigate then are the spaces of the
‘internal’ symmetry of the Yang–Mills gauge fields as additional dimensions
of a higher dimensional, physical space–time manifold (cf. Ibid., p. 132). This
means that interactions other than gravitation are accounted for by additional
bundle spaces being attached to each point in space–time. Roughly speaking
then, in the case of, say, the strong interaction between quarks, which is usu-
ally described by quantum chromodynamics, this would mean that a ‘colour
space’ is attached to each point and that the interaction is described by ‘geo-
metrodynamic events’ like parallel displacements (cf. Ibid., p. 13).
On this basis, Mielke claims that the ‘description of fundamental inter-
actions is [. . .] essentially building on geometrical concepts only’ (Ibid.,
p. 131). In a sense this is surely true, but the question arises whether such
a broad notion of geometry is what Wheeler (or Mie [1912] or Weyl [1918])
were aiming for. Of course, by using the language of fibre bundles for quan-
tum chromodynamics one can describe the interaction between quarks as
geometrodynamics in colour space. Apart from using concepts like ‘parallel
displacement’, one can express important variables directly by means of
the properties of a vector bundle. But, arguably, this is technical jargon
rather than a genuine reduction of matter to space–time geometry in
Wheeler’s original sense. (Of course, a mathematician might argue that the
30 I use Mielke as an example here although the mathematical inventory of his geometrization
approach goes already back to, amongst others (Trautman [1973]; Wu and Yang [1975];
Drechsler and Mayer [1977]; Hehl and Sˇijacˇki [1980]). See also (Trautman [1980]) for an
overview.
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fibre bundle formalism has a certain connection to our geometrical intuition
and that—within mathematics—it was derived from those intuitions; but this
does not turn Mielke’s approach into a Wheelerian geometrodynamics in any
strong physical sense.31)
Indeed even an analogy to Weyl’s agent theory might be claimed; at least if
one was willing to emphasize that in Mielke’s approach the internal degrees of
freedom of particles are not spatio-temporal but rather are a kind of ‘tran-
scendent attachment’ to the four-dimensional world of appearances. So in this
sense one might even claim that the transcendent reality Weyl was so vague
about in 1926/27 may now be expressed in much more detail in terms of
bundle spaces. Arguably, however, there is no concept of matter as being an
agent. Parts of geometry have become transcendent, so to speak, but matter is
still to be dissolved in that geometry.32
Another serious problem of an agent theoretic interpretation of Mielke’s
approach is given by its classical framework. The fibre bundle formalism itself
is based on classical field theory, and so arguably this approach deviates
strongly from Weyl’s demand for a genuine role to be played by statistics in
physics; and with it, as Weyl would presumably argue, it lacks the proper
philosophical concepts of time and causation. Altogether then, the geometro-
dynamics of gauge fields turns out to have hybrid elements but on the whole
shows a tendency towards the field theoretic, Cartesian approach to matter.
3.4 Quantum gravity: quantum general relativity
versus string theory
Generally speaking, one central element of the physical approaches discussed
in this section (apart perhaps from the Wheeler–Feynman approach) is the
combination of general relativity and quantum physics. Somehow or other,
Weyl, Wheeler, and Mielke all aim at a theory that brings together gravitation
and quantum phenomena. But admittedly, most of the physicists today
31 Arguably, simply using some geometrically connotated expressions (or using a formalism ori-
ginally derived from geometrical intuitions) does not mean that as a consequence physics is
geometrodynamics; compare the following quote from (Weinberg [1972], p. 147), about the shift
of geometrical concepts in physics from playing a genuine intuitive role to merely being some
terminological hangover: ‘It is therefore not surprising that Einstein and his successors have
regarded the effects of a gravitational field as producing a change in the geometry of space and
time. At one time it was even hoped that the rest of physics could be brought into a geometric
formulation, but this hope was met with disappointment, and the geometric interpretation of the
theory of gravitation has dwindled to a mere analogy, which lingers in our language in terms like
“metric”, “affine connection”, and “curvature”, but is not otherwise very useful.’
32 Though admittedly one could perhaps argue that there is a transcendental concept of matter
involved here; namely insofar as the base manifold is not space–time itself (the gravitational
interaction also takes place in a bundle space) but is merely an indexing device for points.
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consider their views to be rather exotic. So let me conclude this section with
a discussion of what seem to be the two main routes towards a quantized
theory of gravitation in contemporary physics.33
The first route is to start directly from general relativity and to apply heur-
istic quantization rules to gain ‘quantum general relativity’, as one might call
it. Within quantum general relativity one can distinguish between covariant
approaches which, for example, start from perturbative renormalization
theory and view the transformation behaviour of gauge fields as being a geo-
metrical aspect of the theory (in its quantized form famously leading to ghost
fields). Both matter and field are then described by quantum fields (with dif-
ferent spin though) which are genuinely dynamical. So, in a sense, this genuine
probabilistic approach can be understood as a kind of geometrodynamics in
which geometry must not be stipulated separately but follows from the gauge
principle.34 Apart from covariant there are also canonical approaches, the
most prominent one presumably being loop quantum gravity in which no
fixed background metric is assumed but space–time is conceived as a dynamic
field which must be quantized directly. Other canonical approaches include
metric formulations using the Wheeler–DeWitt equation.35
Following the second route one does not quantize general relativity directly
or separately. Here, instead, one searches for a candidate for a unified quan-
tum framework of all interactions. The most distinguished approach in this
direction is string theory, assuming the basic constituents of physics to be
one-dimensional objects (strings) instead of pointlike particles. In this case
one investigates the general mechanics of such extended objects in hope of
getting a framework for the whole of physics.
So quantum general relativity and string theory differ in their respective
attitude towards physics: the former emphasizes and builds a theory on what
seems to be a firm ground (namely, the structure of space–time and its de-
scription by general relativity), whereas the latter starts from a more general
speculation about what matter might be and how it relates to (or even con-
stitutes) space and time. Whereas quantum general relativity does not imme-
diately (or necessarily) lead to an unified theory of all interactions, string
theory is meant to be a theory of everything. Gravity is supposed to be
33 So in what follows I will say nothing about the different axiomatic and constructivist
approaches in the quantum field theoretic descriptions of strong and electro-weak interactions;
cf. (Dosch et al. [2005]) for this. For an overview of the two ways of quantizing gravity that I
discuss here see (Kiefer [2006]).
34 See (Scharf [2001], pp. 115 and 204), who extends the causal approach in perturbative quantum
field theory to the case of spin 2, where instead of a Lie algebra one gets the Einstein Lagrangian.
35 Since general relativity is sometimes called geometrodynamics, the metric formulation is
sometimes called ‘quantum geometrodynamics’; see, e.g. (Kiefer [2004], pp. 1 and 118), and
(Kiefer [2006]). This, however, must not be confused with the special usage of this term in the
context of a quantized version of Wheeler’s geometrodynamic programme (cf. above).
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necessarily contained in string theory; here an effective low energy approxi-
mation gives the Einstein–Hilbert action of general relativity.
Generally speaking one might say that because of its different starting point
string theory does not entertain such a prominent or even primordial concept
of space–time as does quantum general relativity.36 In particular, the existence
of extended objects in string theory has the important consequence that,
unlike in canonical approaches to quantum general relativity, space–time
cannot be assumed to be locally flat. The principle of background independ-
ence of general relativity cannot be implemented directly in string theory and
an external background space–time is assumed (cf. Kiefer [2004], p. 279).37 So
the two major ways of quantizing gravitation can be distinguished by the
different status they attribute to general relativity and the claims, which
follow from these, about what is firmly given or secured on the level of the
description of four-dimensional space–time.
It has been argued that the concepts of quantum general relativity, as they
are directly related to the classical theory of general relativity, are much better
understood than those of string theory which are only related to concepts from
quantum field theory which in turn are themselves poorly understood beyond
the perturbative level (cf. Kiefer [2004], p. 3). This argument again relies on a
particular emphasis and trustworthiness of general relativity as a kind of
prototype description of four-dimensional space–time. (Indeed, one might
argue for the exact opposite, namely that the fairly direct links between con-
cepts in string theory and quantum field theory—like that of a particle or an
S-matrix—are particularly welcome and that, e.g., loop quantum gravity lacks
such links.38 However, I do not wish to discuss this here. My main point is
simply that, according to its self-understanding, quantum general relativity
has the advantage of an allegedly conceptually and historically firm origin in
classical general relativity and heuristic quantization rules.39)
36 Putting it a little more formally, the difference in the formalism is that in string theory, unlike
for instance, in loop quantum gravity, the space–time diffeomorphism group appears only as
part of a much bigger structure; cf. (Isham [1994]) for an overview.
37 Details, however, are rather tricky and currently under discussion. Indeed the AdS/
CFT-correspondence (cf. below) in string theory comes close to background independence in
some respect; see (Aharony et al. [2000]). Besides, Brunetti and Fredenhagen ([2006]) have done
important work for showing that the covariant approach to quantum general relativity is back-
ground independent in the sense that the change of a given background is a symmetry of the
theory. For a more general and philosophical discussion of background independence see also
(Rovelli [2004]) and (Smolin [2006]).
38 Nicolai and Peeters ([2007]) are advocates of loop quantum gravity, but they concede that, in
contrast to string theory, their approach ‘must face up right away to the question of what an
observable quantity is’.
39 See (Kiefer [2004], p. 21): ‘The main advantage of [loop quantum gravity] is that the starting
point is given. [. . .] The main disadvantage [of string theory] is that the starting point is entirely
speculative.’ Note that—although presumably unintended by the author—this phrasing fits with
Weyl’s distinction between Husserlian phenomenology (starting from a ‘given’) and Fichtean
constructivism (starting from reflexive structures of the ego as being ‘speculative’ in the sense of
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So, like Weyl’s unified field theory and like Wheeler’s and Mielke’s
geometrodynamics, quantum general relativity is also primarily motivated
by general relativity and starts from the allegedly firmly based concept of
background independence. So in Weyl’s sense, it might be described as tending
towards a field theoretic understanding of matter. (I use the phrases ‘might be’
and ‘tending’ here since quantum general relativity does not aim at dissolving
matter into pure extension and, given that it operates in the framework of
quantum fields, does not dismiss all notions of probability or statistics. But
although there are obviously hybrid elements in quantum general relativity,
in particular as compared with string theory, the agent theoretic aspects seem
to be rather small.)
In contrast, string theory starts from a more general speculation about what
matter might be (other than just curved space–time or assumed pointlike
particles) and that this matter is not necessarily, or from the beginning
placed outright in ordinary four-dimensional space–time. The strings them-
selves are first described as being in a different (transcendent) sphere. In this
respect string theory is rather similar to Weyl’s agent theory and it is therefore
not by chance that both entertain a ‘holographic principle’. By this I mean a
mathematical theorem which in the present context relates the so to speak
primordial and constitutional sphere of matter with four-dimensional space–
time—or if one likes philosophical catchwords, it is something like a ‘tran-
scendental action principle’. Leibniz as the prime father of all agent theories
of matter has already claimed that appearances in space and time are ‘pictures’
of a monadic transcendental reality (see, e.g., Leibniz [1996], p. 194). Indeed
pretty much the same is true of Weyl’s approach to matter of around 1925 and
of string theory; namely that spatio-temporal events are—and now we can
mathematically be a little more accurate than Leibniz— holograms of a tran-
scendental reality. Holography here means that the physics of a (allegedly
existing) region can be described by the fundamental degrees of freedom
existing on the boundary of this region. In the case of Weyl’s approach, the
holographic principle was given by Gauss’s theorem, which allowed Weyl to
extract all physically relevant information from surface instead of volume
integrals. In the context of string theory, the basic idea originated from the
fact that the entropy of a black hole is proportional to the area of its horizon
(Bekenstein–Hawking). Indeed, this is very similar to what Weyl did in his
agent theory; as in the Bekenstein–Hawking case all relevant physical infor-
mation of the gravitating system is located on the boundary of some spatial
region which lacks a physically describable ‘inside’. Moreover, in the current
the Latin term ‘speculum’ meaning ‘mirror’); see discussion in the next section and cf. (Sieroka
[2007]).
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literature one even finds the Leibnizian claim that the four-dimensional world
of appearance is a hologram.40
As I have just mentioned, the Bekenstein–Hawking entropy was mainly a
heuristic tool. The actual holographic principle of string theory is the so-called
AdS/CFT-correspondence.41 The physical relevance of this correspondence is
indeed disputable and so in this respect one should, perhaps, speak of a ‘con-
jecture’. However, insofar as it is a correct mathematical statement it is indeed
analogous to Weyl’s 1921 holographic principle. For Gauss’s theorem itself is
also a mathematical and not a physical statement.
So the fact that according to Weyl’s agent theory matter is something tran-
scendent and acts in space–time from beyond, is to some extent resembled by
the way in which string theory starts with defining the action of a string on a
two-dimensional world-sheet and then works its way to calculating the effects
of the strings in four-dimensional space–time. This may suggest that in string
theory the concept of time is something rather non-trivial; and indeed it is
rather poorly understood.42 But in quantum general relativity things are also
not straightforward, as it starts as a ‘timeless’ theory in the sense that it lacks
an external time parameter.43 So it is difficult to relate these inner-physical
concepts of time to Weyl’s philosophical claims about time and causation.44
However, the preceding remarks might perhaps suffice to illustrate that some
of the current concerns about the preconditions of spatio-temporal events are
in some respect similar to Weyl’s transcendental considerations about matter.
(Allow me two little comments on my last sentence: first, it was surely not
meant to say that string theorists adopt or should adopt the whole natural
philosophical framework of Weyl’s agent theory. I even think that string the-
orists are indeed better off with avoiding, for instance, comparisons between
matter and ego. Second, I also surely did not mean to advocate string theory
40 The idea goes back to (’t Hooft [1994]). Subsequently, (Susskind [1995]) explicitly claimed that,
given that certain open questions could be answered, ‘string theory provides us with a concrete
example of a holographic world’.
41 According to the AdS/CFT-correspondence string theory on space-times which asymptotically
approach the product of an Anti-de-Sitter (AdS) and a compact space is completely described by
a conformal field theory (CFT) of the boundary at infinity. The relation to Bekenstein–Hawking
is then given by the fact that near the horizon of an extremal Reissner–Nordstrøm black hole
space–time is AdS2  S2.
42 In perturbative string theory time appears as a ‘coupling constant’ in a two-dimensional quan-
tum field theory; and non-perturbatively it must presumably be reconstructed from a holograph-
ic theory starting with an auxiliary space–time metric of the conformal field theory from which
the physical space–time metric is to be derived. For details cf. (Horowitz [1995]).
43 In the canonical approaches to quantum general relativity semiclassical time can be gained from
expressions including integrals over space and functional derivatives of the three-metric. See
(Kiefer [2004]) for details.
44 Indeed, there have been completely different suggestions about how time could emerge in quan-
tum gravity. In particular, as Majid ([2005]) has shown, a small amount of non-commutativity in
the geometry of space could lead to a ‘spontaneous time generation’; and indeed string theory
and some canonical approaches in quantum general relativity (including loop quantum gravity)
exhibit aspects of non-commutative geometry.
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over and above quantum general relativity. It is not the aim of this article to
tell physicists what might or should be the most promising paths to follow.
However, it is the aim of this article to make oppositions visible and to grasp
them in a systematic historiography of theories of matter.)
4 Wavering Between Freedom and Constraint
In the previous section I have applied Weyl’s distinction between substance,
field, and agent theories of matter to recent physics and thereby continued the
historiography of different understandings of matter which, according to
Weyl, already started with the work of Descartes and Leibniz. So it is now
time to reflect on the philosophical embedding and relevance for writing such
a historiography of theories of matter.
Within the conceptual frame of Weyl’s historiography a certain dialectic
structure is apparent. Whereas substance theories are basically out of date
(though they might pop up again from time to time in rather curious fashion—
see the Wheeler–Feynman approach), there is a kind of wavering between the
agent theory of matter as being the only genuinely dynamic view of matter,
and pure field theory as the project of dissolving matter into geometry.
Moreover, although the history of theories of matter is not strictly dichotomic
in the sense that matter would always be assumed to be either a passive geo-
metrical feature of space–time or an active transcendent (or even transcenden-
tal) agent, there still seems to be a point to (i) Weyl’s distinction between the
different general lines in the history of thought and (ii) Weyl’s attempt to
confine and reconcile those different lines by showing and discussing their
historical seesaw.45 In 1924, Weyl summarizes his meta-view on theories of
matter as follows:
What is matter?—Today, after the destruction of substance views, the
balance swings between dynamic [agent] and field theories of matter. An
answer in a few words cannot be given and will never be given [. . .]
Instead of assigning a short and final formula which one has in black and
white and can carry home, this question like all fundamental questions
assigns us with an infinite task (Weyl [1924], p. 510).46
45 One might even take Weyl’s intertwined history and systematics as an explanatory foil for why
today analytic philosophers of physics, when it comes to quantizing gravity, tend to focus their
discussions on loop quantum gravity; see (Wu¨thrich [2006]) as an exemplary case and also for
further references. Their main argument in favour of this approach is the background independ-
ence which they directly inherit from general relativity. Following Weyl, one might view this as a
historical consequence of the fact that, generally speaking, analytic philosophers of physics grow
up in a Humean rather than a Leibnizian tradition and normally do not tend to assume tran-
scendent (let alone transcendental) material agents.
46 ‘Was ist Materie? – Nach der Vernichtung der Substanzvorstellung schwankt heute die Wage
[sic!] zwischen der dynamischen und der Feldtheorie der Materie. Eine Antwort in wenigen
Worten la¨ßt sich nicht geben und wird sich niemals geben lassen [. . .] Statt vor eine kurze
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Obviously historical and systematic aspects go together here. There is a
historical seesaw here between agent and field theories of matter. Given
Weyl’s explication of the respective philosophical background of agent and
field theories, this seesaw can be understood as a wavering between ‘freedom
and constraint’ (Freiheit und Gebundenheit).47 For according to Weyl agent
theories of matter attempt to bring spontaneity into physics and to connect it
with the genuine experience of causation of free human beings, whereas field
physics with its ‘complete rest in continuity’ stays enclosed in the necessity of
non-probabilistic ‘pure law physics’ (reine Gesetzesphysik).
This wavering between freedom and constraint also becomes apparent from
what Weyl says, for instance, about the notion of continuity in mathematics
(which, as already mentioned, is also intimately connected to what he thinks
about physical continua). As with the case of matter, Weyl here presents the
historical development of concepts as a seesaw process between views that
take a mathematical continuum to be given once and for all (as, for instance,
set theory does) and views according to which a continuum has to be actively
and freely construed through decisions made by the mathematician (as, for
instance, in the case of Brouwer’s free choice sequences). Indeed for Weyl the
wavering between freedom and constraint as a historical process can be found
in all major areas of mathematics and physics—the reason for this being that
according to Weyl human beings are fundamentally characterized by this
wavering or tension.48 And consequently, it is exactly this wavering or tension
that acts as the driving force of his whole book Philosophy of Mathematics and
Natural Science (cf. Weyl [1927], especially pp. 53, 78 and 90).
Let me give another example to illustrate this point: in his 1925 paper
‘On the current epistemological situation in mathematics’ (‘Die heutige
Erkenntnislage der Mathematik’), Weyl writes about mathematics as standing
at exactly this gulf between ‘freedom and constraint’ (Weyl [1925], p. 533). The
article starts off with the remark that mathematics is the science of the infinite
and then tells a long story about the to and fro between the concepts of passive
being and active becoming in mathematics. Notably, however, the paper
is called ‘current epistemological situation in mathematics’ and not ‘a brief
history of the infinite’, or something similar. This is because history itself
is part of the current situation, and especially then the prominent debate
between intuitionism and formalism is viewed by Weyl as an historical
endgu¨ltige Formel, die man schwarz auf weiß nach Hause tragen kann, stellt uns diese Frage wie
alle Fragen grundsa¨tzlicher Art vor eine unendliche Aufgabe’.
47 Cf. also (Weyl [1931a], pp. 3–4), and (Weyl [1934], p. 53), where he uses the English term
‘restrictedness’ instead of ‘constraint’.
48 Apart from the aforementioned passages see also (Weyl [1931a], p. 19), and (Weyl [1949]).
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instantiation of the overall wavering. So, as in the case of matter, history
‘assigns us with an infinite task’.
This emphasis on a wavering between freedom and constraint as being
related to the notions of infinity and finiteness, and also the way Weyl uses
this to gain a systematic historiography shows his reception of German
Idealism, in particular to the writings of Fichte.49 In the aforementioned
paper, Weyl even makes this explicit. He says that it is only by looking at
the historical wavering between freedom and constraint that one (re-)cognizes
a ‘rising third realm’ and that it was the ‘born-and-bred constructivist’ Fichte
who ‘first entered this realm’ (Weyl [1925], p. 540). (Of course, Weyl immedi-
ately adds that there are several things and in particular several ‘a priori de-
ductions’ which Fichte was wrong about. According to Weyl, the details of the
‘symbolic constructivism’ he himself aims at have to come from other sources
as well. As shown above, these sources include modern physics—especially
relativity theory and quantum mechanics—and also some concepts from
Leibniz. However, it is also clear that by eliciting matter from its state
of being completely incommunicado and by writing a systematic history of
science Weyl goes beyond Leibniz and beyond the scope of modern physics.
And it is with respect to this general philosophical framework that Weyl
is sympathetic towards Fichte and thinks that on the whole Fichte led con-
structivism on the right track.)
This particular intertwining of history and systematics, of explicating an
ongoing historical development and to thereby gain some very general con-
ceptual insights can be found in nearly all of Weyl’s philosophical writings
starting from about 1920. One can find it, for instance, also in the fourth
edition of Space–Time–Matter from 1922 where Weyl opposes the view that
the problem of space could have been solved ‘at a glance’ or ‘with one flash’
but necessarily needed a long history of works from people like Newton,
Riemann, Einstein, and others (Weyl [1952], p. 148). This comment might
help us to understand the difference between Weyl’s view and that of
Husserlian orthodoxy in 1922 (in which notions like that of a ‘life world’
did not exist yet). Weyl’s particular phrasing here which makes use of an
optical metaphor and so alludes to the original meaning of ‘phenomenology’
might indeed be understood as an early critique on a philosophical view that
entertains the ‘seeing of essences’ (Wesensschau) as one of its core concepts.
For on other occasions Weyl distinguishes Husserlian phenomenology from
Fichtean constructivism by using exactly this notion of ‘seeing’ (das Sehen)
as opposed to ‘creative activity’ (das Scho¨pferische) (Weyl [1925], p. 541).50
49 The difference from a Schelling-type approach here is discussed in (Sieroka [2007]).
50 This dichotomy is made even more explicit in (Weyl [1954b], p. 641), where he says that Fichte ‘is
anything but a phenomenologist, he is a constructivist of the purest sort’ (‘er ist alles andere als
ein Pha¨nomenologe, er ist ein Konstruktivist reinsten Wassers’).
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And, as he later makes it explicit: ‘it is not enough to have one’s eyes opened
widely; [truth] must be gained by acting’;51 and so Weyl claims that ‘as for
the opposition between constructivism and phenomenology, on the whole
my sympathy is on his [Fichte’s] side’ (Weyl [1954b], p. 643).52
Going back to Weyl’s distinction between theories of matter, it turns out
that the metaphors Weyl is using to explicate phenomenology and pure field
physics coincide to some extent; for both are opposed to ‘activity’, both are
‘silent’ in some respect, and rest in the supposedly given continuity of spatio-
temporal appearances. Indeed, as already mentioned, phenomenology had
been the major philosophical resource for Weyl’s 1918 unified field theory.
Similarly, the difference between the agent theory of matter and phenomen-
ology is also evident from Weyl’s strong notion of causation.53 Again and
especially in relation to scientific experiments, Weyl emphasizes that a human
being must understand itself as being the cause of certain happenings rather
than being a silent observer (Weyl [1927], p. 147). This again is not so much
a phenomenological point of view but rather follows Fichte—and indeed
coincides to a large extent with Helmholtz’s view on experiments in which
the latter also followed Fichte (Heidelberger [1995], [1998]).
So much for the difference from phenomenology. But in how far does
Weyl’s thinking also differ from the other predominant view in German aca-
demia around 1920, namely neo-Kantianism? In particular, in how far does it
differ from the Marburg School where Cassirer also wrote a systematic his-
toriography of science and mathematics?54 To answer this question, let me
start with Weyl’s rather harsh critique on Kant himself. In Philosophie der
Mathematik und Naturwissenschaften, he says that Kant’s philosophical
system suffers from being a doctrine of two separate worlds and that there
is basically no possibility in Kant to get the four-dimensional world of
51 ‘[. . .] es genu¨gt nicht, große Augen zu machen, [die Wahrheit] will durch Handeln gewonnen
sein’ (Weyl [1949], p. 334).
52 ‘In dem Gegensatz von Konstruktivismus und Pha¨nomenologie liegt meine Sympathie im
ganzen auf seiner Seite’.
53 Moreover, it is tempting to describe the relation between the Fichtean ‘Wissenschaftslehre’ and
Husserlian phenomenology in terms of the following physical analogue: as in string theory (it
being the most promising candidate for a modern variant of a Leibniz–Fichte agent theory of
matter) where general relativity occurs inevitably as a low-energy effective theory, one might say
that phenomenology (as compared with the ‘Wissenschaftslehre’) is the limit theory which as-
sumes (rather than deduces) intuition. Anachronistically speaking, Fichte would surely not deny
the Husserlian doctrine that the world around us appears as given (just as the string theorist does
not deny general relativity). Fichte would also acknowledge the reasonableness of having a
discipline which investigates the structure of what appears to us as given. However, Fichte
would argue, there should also be a discipline which is concerned with how it comes that the
world appears as given. The analogy to Weyl’s theories of matter would then be the move from
pure field physics describing the world of appearance to assuming matter to be an agent con-
stitutive of those spatio-temporal appearances (fields).
54 See his Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff and Philosophie der symbolischen Formen; i.e.
(Cassirer [1994], [1988]).
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appearance into contact with the moral world of reason endowed creatures
(Weyl [1927], p. 157). (Some years later in a letter Weyl even wrote that ‘as I
think the book shows, I do not take Kant very seriously. Wherever he comes
to talk about problems (space, matter) which touch on science he falls far
behind Leibniz’; additionally he characterizes himself as someone who ‘is
rather tempted to laugh about the details of Kant’s thoughts than to furrow
one’s brow’.55)
As Weyl explicitly acknowledges in this context, it is Fritz Medicus whom
he follows in his critique.56 Medicus was Weyl’s colleague for philosophy at
the ETH and the one who made Weyl read Fichte in the first place (See
Sieroka [2007] for details). Medicus’s critique ([1926], pp. 82–4) on Kant
roughly goes like this: since space and time are forms of intuition and since
the subject entertains causality as one of the categories of the understanding,
the world of appearance is in this sense causally closed. But this concept of
causality is obviously not Weyl’s (or Medicus’s) experiential notion of caus-
ation. According to Medicus, this closeness which is related in Kant to the
notion of the thing-in-itself somehow separates the world of spatio-temporal
appearances from what Kant says about the realm of freedom; i.e., of sub-
jectivity and spontaneity. As Medicus puts it, ‘all events taking place in space
and time are a superfluous performance with respect to moral reality’ (Ibid.,
p. 83).57 But this, Medicus and Weyl claim, is obviously wrong.
According to Medicus, the first philosopher who overcame the Kantian
separation between the two worlds was Fichte. He did so by putting emphasis
on the notion of life and human existence in the world. Fichte claimed that the
central principle of all philosophy is that one can affect something (Ich wirke)
(Fichte [1995], p. 2). He also maintained that true philosophy always has to
start from life and that it must ‘exhaust the human being as a whole’ (Fichte
[1971], p. 372, [1997], p. 202; cf., e.g. Medicus [1905], [1919], [1951], passim).
He thereby initiated something like an anthropological turn in philosophy,
after which the ingression and relevance of spontaneity and moral issues for
our daily concerns was taken more seriously. According to Medicus, it was
55 Quoted from letters to Magdalene Aebi from 1948/49 (ETH-Bibliothek, Archive, Hs 91: 2–3:
‘U¨brigens glaube ich, zeigt das Buch [. . .], dass ich Kant nicht sonderlich ernst nehme. [. . .] Wo
immer er auf Probleme zu sprechen kommt (Raum, Materie), die die Naturwissenschaft ber-
u¨hren, bleibt er weit hinter Leibniz zuru¨ck [. . .] Fu¨r jemanden, der wie ich u¨ber Kants
Gedankengang im einzelnen eher zu lachen als die Stirn zu Denkerfalten zu legen geneigt ist
[. . .].’)
56 In (Weyl [1927], p. 157), he refers to (Medicus [1926]). In contrast (Mie [1948], p. 735), acknow-
ledges a great indebtedness to Kant. This is interesting insofar as in the present context phe-
nomenology, pure field physics and Kantianism might perhaps be thought of as being linked to
one another and as standing in opposition to constructivism, agent theories, and Fichteanism.
57 ‘Das ganze in Raum und Zeit ablaufende Geschehen ist fu¨r die sittliche Wirklichkeit eine
u¨berflu¨ssige Veranstaltung’.
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Fichte who, so to speak, got the agency of subjects into direct contact with
spatio-temporal reality (cf. Medicus [1926], p. 84).
The fact that Fichte played such a crucial role for Medicus can partially
be understood by Medicus’s vita (Graf and Christophersen [2004]). His teach-
ers included Windelband and Hensel and so (at least for some time) Medicus
was under the influence of the Southwest German School of neo-Kantianism
in which the works of Fichte played a prominent role—or at least had a much
more prominent role than they did in the Marburg School (Heinz [1997]).
However, since he also studied with Riehl and Eucken, other academic
schools, including the then prominent Lebensphilosophie, also had a bearing
on Medicus’s philosophical development. So, what distinguishes Medicus’s
view in particular from that of the Marburg School, is his attitude towards
Fichte and towards a rather strong notion of life. Moreover, it seems to be this
critique that Weyl adopts from Medicus (supplemented perhaps by being
annoyed by mathematical simple-mindedness, in particular that of Natorp)
(cf. Weyl [1927], p. 99, [1925], p. 516). At least this is what Weyl later alludes
to when he describes Cassirer’s symbolic forms as being ‘rather turbid filters
for the light of truth’ which fail to show or treat the ‘unity of the luminous
center’ of the human being (Weyl [1954a], p. 630). Similar to Medicus, Weyl
here opposes a purely functional definition of human beings which for him
could never account for the concrete unity of being as actually experienced
by the individual.58 (Besides, Weyl could apply basically the same critique
against Husserlian phenomenology, which also lacked strong concepts of
life or human existence.59)
To sum up, Weyl’s interpretation of Fichte is a constructivist one which at
the same time puts emphasis on the concepts of life and experience. (Although
it admittedly lacks resonance in English, the term ‘transcendental pragma-
tism’, Transzendentalpragmatismus, might come to mind here.) Such a reading
of Fichte seems possible and in particular it seems to be a fruitful alternative
to today’s rather standard reading of Fichte as a philosophical foundationalist
interested in some rather mystic self-relation of the ego.60 Moreover, I suggest
that by explicating the historical seesaw of the concept of matter and of
the mathematical accounts of the continuum Weyl showed the historical
dimension of what Fichte called ‘the wavering of the power of imagination’
58 During the 1920s, this critique against Cassirer was first or at least most famously raised by
Heidegger; cf. (Renz [2002], pp. 250–256 and 291).
59 See Weyl’s manuscript on ‘Man and the Foundations of Science’ from 1949: ‘Phenomenology
had lunged out in all directions beyond the narrow boundaries of sensual data; but still its pure
ego was like a spirit soaring above the waters, untainted by worldliness, and it was hard to
conceive how it could ever surrender its immanence and become flesh, man among men.’
(ETH-Bibliothek, Archive, Hs 91a: 28).
60 See, e.g. (Henrich [1993]). However, there are also Fichte scholars who read Fichte similarly to
the way indicated here; cf., e.g. (Rockmore [1995]).
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(das Schweben der Einbildungskraft). According to Fichte, this wavering tem-
pers the opposites between being bound and being free, between the finite and
the infinite ego from which life and consciousness and then concepts of matter,
space and time follow.61 By the same token, Weyl fulfils (at least in part) the
Fichtean programme of philosophy as being the ‘pragmatist historiography of
the human mind’ (Fichte [1997], p. 141, [1991], p. 69). Using Fichtean termin-
ology one might therefore say that with his concept of a wavering between
freedom and constraint and with his notions of life and of an arising third
realm Weyl posits himself in between Husserlian phenomenology and
Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms.
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